Two experiments investigated choice in adult humans on a simulated cooperation task to evaluate a risk-reduction account of sharing based on the energy-budget rule. The energy-budget rule is an optimal foraging model that predicts risk-averse choices when net energy gains exceed energy requirements (positive energy budget) and risk-prone choices when net energy gains fall below energy requirements (negative energy budget) . Because sharing can minimize variability in energy gain (i.e. , is a riskaverse strategy) , the model predicts that sharing should occur under positive but not negative budget conditions. Energy budgets were modeled by substituting money gains for energy gains and earnings requirements for energy requirements. Participants chose between work-alone or work-with-others (sharing) response options. Experiment 1 investigated the effects on choice of manipulating the value of the earnings requirement and the presence of the partner's money counter. Choice for the sharing option varied as a function of the earnings requirement in a pattern consistent with the predictions of the energy-budget rule. The presence of the partner's money counter did not influence preference. Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 and also showed that under conditions with no earnings requirement (conditions in which the energy-budget rule makes no predictions) , subjects often preferred the sharing option over the independent option when sharing increased the partner's 13arnings, and that subjects often preferred an independent option over the sharing option when the independent option produced a constant earnings amount. Overall, the results replicate and extend the results of earlier earnings-budget studies and further show that laboratory procedures are useful for evaluating the plredictions of risksensitive and social-foraging models.
A common observation in small-scale societies is that individuals, including those who are not genetically related, frequently share food with one another (e.g., Bliege Bird & Bird, 1997; Cashdan, 1985 Cashdan, , 1990 Gurven, Hill, Kaplan, Hurtado, & Lyles, 2000; Hames, 1990; Hill & Kaplan, 1993; Kelly, 1995) . Although a variety of evolutionary-based hypotheses have been proposed to account for cooperative food sharing, including tolerated theft (e.g., Bliege Bird & Bird, 1997; Kaplan & Hill, 1985) , social benefits (e.g., Hawkes, 1993) , and costly signaling (e.g., Bliege Bird, Smith, & Bird, 2001 ), a hypothesis that has been investigated in a number of studies is that food sharing is a risk-averse strategy that minimizes the probability of a food shortage (e.g., Cashdan, 1985; Kaplan & Hill, 1985; Winterhalder, Lu, & Tucker, 1999) . That is, when food gains are variable, if individuals who have acquired food share with those who have been unsuccessful then energy gains will be averaged across individuals and sharing can protect against a shortfall (Cashdan, 1985) . This riskreduction hypothesis therefore predicts that sharing should vary as a function of the risk of a food shortage (Hawkes, 1992) .
Risk-reduction accounts of food sharing are based on risk-sensitive foraging models that predict that foragers' choices should minimize the probability that net energy gains fall below their energy requirements (Winterhalder, 1997) . The most frequently studied risk-sensitive foraging model is the energy-budget rule (Stephens, 1981; Stephens & Krebs, 1986) . According to the energy-budget rule, choice for a low-variance option will minimize the probability of a shortfall when the energy-budget is positive (i.e., when the current energy reserves and/or the mean rate of energy gain are sufficient to meet the energy requirement), and choice for a high-variance option will minimize the probability of a shortfall when the energy-budget is negative (i.e., when the current energy reserves and/or the mean rate of gain are insufficient to meet the energy requirement). Laboratory studies with nonhumans (e.g., Caraco, Blackenhorn, Gregory, Newman, Recer & Zwicker, 1990; Caraco, Martindale, & Whittam, 1980 ; for reviews see Kacelnik & Bateson, 1996; Real & Caraco, 1986) , field studies with humans (see Winterhalder et aI., 1999) , and several laboratory studies with humans using procedures designed to model positive and negative energy-budget conditions (Pietras & Hackenberg, 2001; Pietras, Locey, & Hackenberg, 2003; Rode, Cosmides, Hell, & Tooby, 1999) have shown that choice is often consistent with the model's predictions. Winterhalder (1986; see also Winterhalder, 1990) analyzed the effects of sharing on variability in food gains using the equation:
where s is the variability experienced by individual foragers, n is the number of foragers in the sharing group, and R is the interforager correlation in food gain after sharing, and cr (the coefficient of variation) is the variability in food gains after sharing. Winterhalder showed that if food items are acquired asynchronously across fomgers, then sharing with even a small number of individuals can significantly reduce variability in gains. For example, Winterhalder noted that if the intertorager correlation (R) is -1, then sharing with only one other person (n = 2) will reduce the variability after sharing (0) to zero. Thus, foraging independently would be a high-variance choice option and sharing with others would be a low-variance choice option. Except under severe conditions (negative energy budgets), risk minimization models therefore predict that, because sharing reduces variability, foragers should share food.
Results of field studies designed to investigate the role of risk reduction in food sharing have been mixed, however. Several studies have indicated that reducing variability in food gains may be an important determinant of sharing (e.g., Cashdan, 1985; Gurven, 2004a; Gurven, Hill, et ai., 2000; Hames, 1990; Kaplan & Hill, 1985) .
For example, Kaplan and Hill (1985) showed that unpredictable but highly valuable resources, such as meat and honey, were shared more frequently than low quality resources that were acquired more consistently. More often, though, studies have not found support for the model. For instance, studies have shown that successful hunters often receive significantly less food than they give to others, and that individuals who never reciprocate food transfers are given shares (e.g., Bliege Bird & Bird, 1997; Bliege Bird, Bird, Smith, & Kushnick, 2002; Bliege Bird et ai., 2001; Hawkes, 1993; Hawkes, O'Connell, & Blurton Jones, 2001 ). Because such sharing patterns contradict the predictions of risk-minimization models (i.e. , successful individuals do not appear to receive sufficient food benefits from sharing), these findings suggest that, if risk reduction indeed affects food sharing , it is not the only factor governing sharing in these populations.
In the field, it is often difficult to isolate the effects of single variables on behavior, including the effects of variability and shortfall risks. Laboratory studies may thus help provide important information about the extent to which these variables influence choice. For example, Kameda, Takezawa, Tindale, and Smith (2002) investigated the effects of variability on sharing under laboratory conditions by giving subjects an opportunity to give money to others. In their study, subjects were paid for completing math problems. Subjects were told either that the amount paid per problem was predetermined or that it was determined randomly, although the amount was identical for all subjects. When subjects were asked to help other students by giving them money, subjects who were told that their earnings were determined randomly gave more than the other subjects. Kameda et al. concluded that the variability in earnings engendered greater sharing.
Although Kameda et al. (2002) showed that variability in earnings influenced sharing, because there were no requirements comparable to an energy requirement and no differential consequences for giving to others, the study did not directly assess the effects of risk reduction on sharing. The aims of the present experiments thus were to (a) develop a procedure to experimentally investigate the effects of risk and resource requirements on sharing and (b) test the generality of the predictions of risk-reduction models. The procedure was modeled after one used by Pietras and Hackenberg (2001) to investigate the predictions of the energy-budget rule in humans. In their procedure, positive and negative earnings budgets were used to model positive and negative energy budgets. Specifically, monetary gains and a monetary-earnings requirement were used to model energy gains and an energy requirement. Sessions were divided into blocks of trials and within a block subjects chose between options that produced fixed or variable amounts of pOints/money. To simulate starvation risk, subjects were allowed to later exchange block earnings for cash only if the amount met the earnings requirement (i.e. , survival). If the amount was below the requirement, the earnings were lost (i.e., starvation). Positive and negative earnings budgets were generated by manipulating the value of the requirement. Pietras and Hackenberg showed that, consistent with the predictions of the energybudget rule, choice was risk-averse during positive earnings-budget conditions and risk-prone during negative earnings-budget cond itions.
The present research was designed to investigate the effects of earnings budget on sharing. As in the Pietras and Hackenberg (2001) study, positive and negative earnings budgets were generated by manipulating the value of the earnings requirement. Subjects chose between work-alone and a work-with-others (sharing) options each block. Subjects were told that they were paired with others but actually worked alone. Within a block, responses on the work-alone option produced a variable amount of money. Responses on the work-withothers option also produced a variable amount of money but, at the end of the block, the subject's and partner's earnings were pooled and divided equally. Because the subject's and partner's earnings were negatively correlated (R = -1), sharing produced a constant amount of money. Subjects could exchange block earnings for cash if the amount met the earnings requirement. Across conditions , the value of the requirement was manipulated so that, compared to the work-alone option, sharing had a greater (positive earnings-budget conditions), lower (negative earnings-budget conditions), or same (no-requirement conditions) probability of meeting the requirement. Choice was evaluated in relation to the predictions of the energy-budget rule which predicts choice for the sharing (risk-averse) option under positive earnings-budget conditions and choice for the work-alone (risk-prone) option under negative earnings-budget conditions. Choice was investigated under no-requirement conditions (in which the model makes no predictions) to assess biases for either option in the absence of an earnings requirement.
In Experiment 1, to prevent sharing from affecting the partner's total earnings, the procedure was arranged so that the partner had no earnings requirement. As a result, the partner's total earnings would exceed the subject's total earnings in most conditions. Previous cooperation studies have shown that such inequity in earnings can influence choice. 1 For example, studies have shown that when one subject in a cooperating pair receives greater benefits from cooperating than the other subject, the underpaid subject may shift to an independent response option (e.g., Schmitt & Marwell, 1972; Shimoff & Matthews., 1975; Spiga, Cherek, Grabowski, & Bennett, 1992) . To determine if the presence of the partner's earnings would influence preference, Experiment 1 investigated the effects of earnings budget on choice under conditions in which the partner's total earnings were not shown (Partner's Earnings Absent) or shown (Partner's Earnings Present) on the complUter screen. Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 (partner's-earnings-present conditions) and also investigated choice under conditions in which (a) the partner had an earnings requirement and sharing could increase the partner's earnings, and (b) a low-variance, independent response option was available.
Experiment 1

Method
Subjects
The subjects were 3 adult males who were 2~; (S-2480), 29 (S-2486), and 21 (S-2503) years old and 1 adult female who was 38 years old (S-2731). Subjects were recruited via a newspaper advertisement. Potential subjects were excluded from participation for current medical problems, current drug use, or for meeting criteria for an Axis 1 psychiatric disorder (other than substance dependence) as speci1iied by the Structured Clinical Interview (First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1996) for the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) . Each day of participation subjects were required to provide a urine sample 'for drug screen analysis and a breath sample for measuring breath-alcohol concentrations.
Apparatus
Subjects were seated in one of two identical 1.2-m by 1.8-m soundattenuating test chambers. Each chamber contained a 36.5-cm (14 in) VGA color monitor and a 43-cm long, 25-crn wide, and 10-cm high response panel containing three microswitch buttons labeled "A," "B," and "C" from right to left. An illustration of the computm monitor and response panel is shown in Figure 1 . A 60-W light on the ceiling of the chamber 1 A behavioral contingency has been defined as cooperative if reinforcers for each participant depend in part upon the responses of others (Hake & Olvera, 1978) ; if reinforcers are delivered to all participants when their joint responses me,et a criterion (Schmitt, 1984) ; or if an individual's responses produce reinforcers for both himself or herself and the partner (Spiga, Cherek, Grabowski, & Bennett, 1992) . In the present procedure, the partner was simulated, the partner was required to share whenever the subject chose the work-withothers option, and neither the partner nor subject benefite,d from sharing every block. Nevertheless, because choosing the work-with-others option cou ld increase the partner's or subject's earnings, and because the subject's and partner's block payment depended on their combined earnings when the work-with-others option was chosen, choice of the workwith-others option may also be viewed as cooperative. provided illumination and a ventilation fan helped mask extraneous noise. Experimental events were programmed and data collected using a remote PC computer equipped with a Med Associates® interface card and Microsoft Visual Basic® software.
Procedure
General procedure. All aspects of the study were approved by the University of Texas Health Science Center Institutional Review Board. To determine whether individuals would show shifts in preference across changes in earnings budget, the study used a single-subject experimental design and each subject experienced all three earnings-budget conditions. Because optimal foraging models typically assume that organisms have complete information about the environment (Smith & Winterhalder, 1992) , subjects were repeatedly exposed to the outcomes of both choice options in forced-choice trials prior to the choice trials each session.
Six experimental sessions were conducted per day at 8:30 a.m., 9:30 a.m., 10:30 a.m., 12:30 p.m., 1 :30 p.m., and 2:30 p.m. and each lasted 27 min. Lunch was provided at 11 :30 a.m. Subjects came into the laboratory 2 to 5 days per week. Subjects were instructed that they were paired with others during experimental sessions, but the behavior of the partner was simulated by the computer software. To determine whether the social deception was effective, at the end of each day subjects were given a questionnaire that asked them to describe (a) the number of people they were paired with that day and (b) their interaction with them. Subjects consistently reported being paired with at least one other person.
Subjects received (a) daily cash payment for the amount earned during each session (averaging $9.00 per session in most conditions), (b) weekly bonuses for drug-free breath-alcohol and urine samples and attendance, and (c) a completion bonus.
Experiment?' sessions. Each session consisted of 18, 5-trial blocks: The first 8 blocks were forced-choice blocks; the remaining 10 blocks were choice blocks. At the start of a block, a counter showing block earnings (initially set to $0.00), the letter "8" (centered in a box), and the words "Press Now" appeared on the computer scmen. When the subject's earnings requirement was $0.00 (see below), the block-earnings counter was colored green , otherwise it was colored red. A single press on the "8" button removed the letter "8" and the words "Press Now" from the screen and initiated the choice phase. In the choice phase the letters "A" and "G" appeared on the screen above the words "Work Alone" and "Work-with-Others," respectively (see Figure 1 ). One response on the "A" or "G" button removed the alternative option from the screen. Only the selected option was operative for the remainder of the block. Thus, only one choice occurred per block. Twenty responses on the selected option were required to add money to the block-earnings counter. Following 20 responses on the selected option [i.e., a fixed-ratio (FR) 20 schedule] the size of the block-earnings counter increased for 0.5 s and its value increased by $0.00 or $0.20 (p = .5). If the valuE~ of the block-earnings counter equaled or exceeded the earnings requirement, its color changed from red to green. After a 2.5-s delay, the chosen option reappeared on the screen and another 20 responses were required to produce money.
After five, FR 20 trials (i.e., at the end of the block), the subject's earnings varied between $0.00 and $1.00.
The sequence of events at the end of a block differed slightly across partner's-earnings-absent and partner's-earnin~~s-present conditions. Figure 2 shows the sequence of events at the end of a block following work-alone and work-with-others choices under both conditions.
Partner's earnings absent. When the work··alone "A" option was selected, 2.5 s following the fifth trial of the block, the words "Your earnings:" appeared above the block-earnings counter. After 3 s, the cumulative earnings counter labeled "Your total earnings:" appeared below it. If the block earnings met the earnings requirement then the block earnings were added to the cumulative counter. If the block earnings were below the requirement, no money was added to the cumulative counter and the block-earnings counter was reset to-$0.00 after 2.5 s. After a 5-s delay, all stimuli were removed from the computer screen and an interblock interval was initiated (see below).
When the work-with-others ("G") option was selected, 2.5 s after the fifth trial the words "Your earnings:" appeared on the screen above the block-earnings counter. After 1.5 s, the partner's block earnings counter, colored white, and the words "Other's earnings:" also appeared. On a random half of the trials, this delay was increased by 1 to 20 s and the words "Please Wait" were shown on the screen. This delay was designed Figure 2. Sequence of events at the end of a block when the work-alone ("A") option or the work-with-others (U C") option was selected during conditions in which the partner's cumulative earnings were absent (left panel) and present (right panel) . In this example, the earnings requirement was $0.50 and the subject had earned $0.60 during the block. In each panel , events are shown sequentially from top to bottom.
to help maintain the social deception by modeling situations in which the partner took longer than the subject to complete a block. The partner's earnings were always $1,00 minus the subject's earnings. Following a 3-s delay, the subject's and partner's earnings were summed together on the screen (totaling $1.00). The words "Your Share:" and "Other's Share:" appeared 3 s later above two counters displaying "$0.50" (the subject's and partner's share of the total). The subject's $0.50 counter was colored either green or red , depending on whether the amount did or did not meet, respectively, the subject's earnings requirement The partner's $0.50 counter was colored white. All stimuli were removed from the screen after 10 s except for the words "Your Share:" and the subject's $0.50 counter. The money was added to the cumulative counter only if the amount met the earnings requirement After 5 s, all stimuli were removed from the screen and the interblock interval was initiated. The duration of the interblock interval varied across blocks so that each block began exactly 90 s from the onset of the preceding block. Thus, the "Please Wait" delay that occasionally followed work-with-others choices did not increase the delay to the next block or the overall session duration, Partner's earnings present. The sequence of events under partner'searnings-present conditions were identical to those described under partner's-earnings-absent conditions except that when the words "Your total earnings:" and the subject's cumulative earnings appeared on the screen, (14) 7 (5) 4 (6) (14) SR=0.60
7 (5) 9 (5) 9 (5) the words "Other's total earnings:" and the partner's cumulative earnings also appeared on the screen. Because the partner's earnings requirement was $0.00 across all conditions, the partner's block-earnings counter and $0.50 counter were always colored green and the earnings were always added to the partner's cumulative counter. The partner's earnings were added to the partner's cumulative counter at the same time that the subject's block earnings were added to his or her cumulative counter. The eight forced choice blocks were identical to choice blocks except that only the work-alone ("A") or work-with-others ("C") option was presented on the screen. Both options were presented on four blocks each in a random order.
Earnings-budget manipulation. The earni ngs requirement was systematically manipulated across conditions and was either $0.00 (SR=O.OO), $0.50 (SR=0.50), or $0.60 (SR=0.60). Subjects were typically exposed to partner's-earnings-absent conditions prior to the partner'searnings-present conditions. Subject 2480 was exposed to the SR=0.60 condition only under present conditions because this subject had already showed an exclusive preference for work-alone option under SR=O.OO partner's-earnings-absent conditions. Subject 2486 quit the study before completing the SR=0.50 and SR=O.60 partner's-earningspresent conditions. Table 1 shows the sequence and number of sessions per condition for each subject. Conditions were changed after a minimum of five sessions and when the number of work-with-others choices across three consecutive sessions was judged stable by visual inspection (i.e ., when choices showed little session-to-session variability and no increasing or decreasing trends). In 93% of conditions, choices across stable sessions did not vary from one another by more than two choices; in two cases choices varied from one another by three choices.
Prior to the first experimental session, subjects were read the following scripted instructions designed to provide minimal information about the task. While the instructions were read the events were drawn on a dry-erase board . The instructions were: Today, you will be able to earn money by working at the response console. This is a drawing of the response panel and computer monitor. You will be participating with other persons in this study. These other people also have response panels and monitors. These other people are located at another facility [included because participants shared a common waiting area].
As the drawing illustrates, the response panel contains three buttons labeled A, Band C. When the session starts, the letter B, the words "Press Now," and a counter will appear on the computer screen. The counter will be at zero. Pushing the B button will cause the letter B and the words "Press Now" to go off the screen and will cause other letters to appear. Either the letter A, the letter C, or both letters A and C will appear. The words "Work Alone" will appear beneath the letter A and the words "Work with Others" will appear beneath the letter C. When only one letter is on the computer screen, pushing the button that corresponds to the letter on the screen will add money to the counter. When both letters A and C are on the computer screen , you can push either button A or button C. The letter you have selected will remain on the screen and the other letter will disappear. Pushing the button corresponding to the letter on the screen will add money to the counter. Several counters may appear on the computer screen during the session. The amount of money shown on the counter labeled "Your total earnings" is the amount you have earned during the session. Figure 3 shows the mean number of work-with-others choices across the final three sessions of each condition for each subject during partner's-earnings-present and partner's-earnings-absent conditions. There was no effect on choice of the presence of the partner's earnings on the computer screen. Under the no-requirement (SR=OO) conditions when neither choice of the alone or sharing option was predicted , the number of work-with-others choices varied across subjects. For 2 subjects (2480 and 2731) , the number of work-with-others choices was low during the initial exposures to this condition , but increased across successive exposures, indicating that experience with the earnings requirement influenced choice. The other 2 subjects showed little preference (2486) or a strong preference (2503) for the sharing option. When the earnings requirement was $0.50 (SR=0.50 conditions) and work-with -others choices could minimize the probability of a shortfall , all subjects preferred the work-with-others option (mean number of work-with -others choices averaged 9.0). Conversely, under the highest requirement (SR=0.60) conditions, all subjects preferred the workalone option (mean number of work-with-others choices equaled 0. conditions and SR=0.60 (negative earnings-budget) conditions were therefore consistent with the predictions of a risk-· reduction food-sharing model that predicts that sharing should occur only when sharing reduces the probability of an energy deficit (Winterhalder, 1997) . For most subjects, preference shifted rapidly following a condition change , suggesting that experience with the outcomes of work-alone and workwith-others choices during forced-choice trials influenced choice. Figure 4 shows mean earnings (in dollars) during choice trials across the final three sessions of each condition averaged across subjects. Du ring SR=O.OO conditions, mean earnings were near the programmed mean of $5.00. During SR=0.50 conditions, earnin !~s were similar to those obtained under SR=O.OO (mean earnings were $4 . . 80) , except for Subject 2483 whose earnings were lower as a result of this subject's greater number of work-alone choices. At the highest earnings requirement (SR=0.60 conditions) mean earnings were lower, averaging $3.72, and were more variable than during the SR=O.OO and SR=0.50 conditions. Overall , Figu re 4 shows that, by minimizing the probability of a shortfall , choices maintained earnings during choice blocks near the programmed (mean) maximum of $5.00 during positive earnings-budget conditions and $3.44 during negative earnings-budget conditions. If the work-alone option had been preferred during positive earnings-budget (SR=0.50) cond itions, earnings would have averaged near $3.44, and if the workwith-others option had been preferred during negative earnings-budget (SR=0.60) conditions, earnings would have been $0.00. Sharing was maintained under positive earnings budget (SR=O.50) conditions although the partner's total earnings typically exceeded the subject's total earnings. For example, at the end of the forced-choice trials during SR=O.50 partner's-earnings-present conditions the subject's and partner's earnings averaged $3.41 and $3.94, respectively. Despite the inequity in earnings, all subjects showed a preference for the work-withothers option during choice blocks. Although it is possible that sharing was maintained under SR=O.50 conditions because sharing produced greater earnings than nonsocial choices and therefore reduced the inequity, the presence of the partner's earnings on the computer screen did not influence choice. This suggests that reducing inequity was not critical in maintaining choice for the sharing option.
Results and Discussion
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Experiment 2
Experiment 1 showed that the presence of the partner's cumulative earnings on the computer screen did not influence choice. However, all subjects were exposed to partner's-earnings-absent conditions (in which the partner's counter was not shown on the computer screen) prior to partner's-earnings-present conditions (in which the partner's counter was shown on the computer screen). Thus, one goal of Experiment 2 was to investigate the effects of the earnings-requirement on choice under partner's-earnings-present conditions without the prior exposure to partner's-earnings-absent conditions.
In Experiment 1, several subjects showed a preference for the work-with-others option under SR=O.OO (no requirement) conditions. One possible explanation for this preference is that subjects preferred a social over a nonsocial option. Another possibility is that subjects preferred a low-variance to a high-variance option. That is, work-alone choices produced $0.50 on average each block, but earnings could vary between $0.00 and $1.00. Work-with-others choicles produced a constant $0.50 each block. Risky-choice research has shown that when subjects are presented with choices between options dHlivering constant (i.e., certain) and variable amounts of money with the same mean value, the constant option is typically preferred (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Lane & Cherek, 2001; Schneider & Lopes, 1986) . Thus, a second aim of Experiment 2 was to investigate the effects of within-block variability in earnings on sharing. Experiment 2 directly replicated the earnings-budget conditions of Experiment 1 (partner's-earnings-present conditions), but in several conditions in which the requirement was $0.00 (SR=O.OO conditions), a second, independent (work-alone) response option was added that yielded a constant amount of money each block ($0.50). If the work-with-others option was preferred under SR=O.OO conditions but the constant, work-alone option was preferred under SR=O.OO three-option conditions, this would suggest that choice under SR=O .OO conditions was influenced by variance reduction and not social variables.
Because the choice patterns under most conditions in Experiment 1 could be explained by the different probabilities of reinforcement for workalone and work-with-others choices, it is unclear whether choices were influenced by social variables (i.e., the presence of another person). That the "C" (work-with-others) option was described as a social option may have been irrelevant to performance. Thus, a final aim of Experiment 2 was to investigate whether social variables would influence choice in this procedure. In several conditions in which the subject had no earnings requirement, the partner's earnings requirement was increased to $0.50. Under these conditions, sharing would not affect th,e subject's earnings but would minimize the probability that the partner's earnings would fall below the requirement (i.e ., sharing would increase the partner's net earnings). A preference for the sharing option under these conditions would suggest that choice was sensitive to the partner's earnings. To study the effects of the partner's earnings on sharing apart from the effects of variance reduction, choice was also studied under these conditions when a constant, alone option was available.
Method Subjects
The subjects were 3 adult males who were 27 (S-2509), 34 (S-2532), and 33 (S-2598) years old, and 1 adult female who was 19 years old (S-2728). Subjects were recruited via neWSpapE!r advertisements. The selection criteria, screening for DSM-IV Axis I disorders, and criteria for drug-abstinence were the same as in Experiment 1.
Apparatus
The apparatus was the same as in Experiment 1.
Procedure
The procedure was similar to Experiment 1 (partner's-earningspresent conditions) with two main exceptions. First, in some conditions a second, work-alone option was added. During these three-option conditions, the letters "A," "B," and "C" appeared on the computer screen in the choice phase. The words "Work Alone" appeared below the letters "A" and "B" and the words "Work-with-Others" appeared below the letter "C." Similar to the other choice options, 20 responses on the second workalone "B" option were required to increment the block-earnings counter. Once the FR 20 response requirement was met, the block-earnings counter was increased by $0.10. Therefore, choice of the work-alone "B" option always produced $0.50 each block. During the eight forcedchoice blocks, the work-alone "A" option and work-alone "B" option were presented in two blocks each, and the work-with-others "C" option was presented in four blocks.
The second difference from Experiment 1 was that the earnings requirement of the fictitious partner was manipulated in several conditions. The partner's earnings requirement was either $0.00 (PR=O.OO) as in Experi ment 1, or $0.50 (PR=0.50). The partner's block earnings counter and $0.50 counter were colored green or red, depending on whether the earnings exceeded or were below the requirement, respectively. The partner's earnings were added to the partner's cumulative counter only if the amount equaled or exceeded the partner's requirement. As in Experiment 1, the subject's earnings requirement also varied across conditions and was either $0.00 (SR=O.OO), $0.50 (SR=0.50), or $0.60 (SR=0.60).
Because the subject's and partner's earnings were inversely correlated, choice for the constant, work-alone "B" option in the SR=0.00/PR=O.50 three-option condition would cause the partner to earn $0.50 and meet their requirement. Thus, both work-alone "B" choices and work-with-others "C" choices could maximize the partner's earnings. To prevent work-alone choices from maximizing the partner's earnings, in this condition only, whenever the work-alone "A" or work:alone "B" option was selected, the partner's earnings were programmed to be uncorrelated with the subject's earnings. As a result , on ly choice for the work-with-others ("C") option could minimize the probability that the partner's earnings would fall below the requirement.
All other features of the procedure were identical to Experiment 1. Table 2 shows the sequence and number of sessions per condition for each subject. Subject 2532 was not exposed to positive earnings-budget (SR=0.50/PR=0.00) conditions due to the strong preference for the workwith-others option under no requirement (SR=O.OO/PR=O.OO) conditions. In addition, Subject 2509 was not exposed to SR=0.00/PR=0.50 three options because this subject showed no preference for the constant, alone option during the SR=O.OO/PR=O.OO three-options condition . The Table 2 Sequence and Number of Sessions per Condition (in parentheses) for Each Subject in Experiment 2 2S09 1 (7) , 3 (10) , 6 (S) , 9 (S)
2 (11) 4 (S) S (10), 7 (7) 8 ( S (7) 7 (S) , 9 (S) 8 (7) Note. SR indicates the subject's earnings requirement and PR indicates the partner's earnings requirement in dollars.
stability criteria were the same as in Experiment 'I. In 89% of conditions, choices across the final three sessions of a condition did not vary from one another by more than two choices; in 1 case (SR=0.60 conditions for Subject 2532) choices varied from one another by five choices.
Results and Discussion
All subjects reported being paired with others during experimental sessions. Figure 5 (left panel) shows for all subjects the mean number of work-with-others choices during the final three sessions of each condition. The right panel of Figure 5 shows the mean number of choices for the variable ("A") and constant ("B") work-alone options during the two threeoption conditions. Similar to Experiment 1, under positive earnings-budget (SR=0.50/PR=0.00) conditions subjects showed a preference for the workwith-others option whereas under negative earnings-budget (SR=0.60/ PR=O.OO) conditions subjects showed a preference for the work-alone option. During the no requirement (SR=O.OO/PR=O.OO) condition choice patterns varied across subjects: One subject (2532) showed a consistent preference for the work-with-others option, 2 subjects (2509 and 2728) showed an increase in work-with-others choices across exposures to this condition , and 1 subject (2598) showed near indifference between the two options.
Under no requirement conditions, when an alone option was added that produced a constant amount of money per block (SR=O.OO/PR=O.OO three options), 1 subject (2509) continued to prefer the work-with-others show that subjects were exposed to the condition but made no work-with-others choices. SR indicates the subject's earnings requirement and PR indicates the partner's earnings requirement in dollars .
option. The remaining 3 subjects (2532, 2598, and 2728) showed a preference for the alone option. For 2 of these 3 subjects (2532 and 2728), the constant work-alone option was strongly preferred over the variable work-alone option, indicating a preference for a cmtain over a probabilistic outcome. This preference suggests that choices for the work-with-others (sharing) option under the no requirement (SR=O . . OO/PR=O.OO) two-option condition occurred because they reduced local (within-block) variability in earnings. Because both the constant work-alone option and the sharing option produced the same outcome (a constant $0.50 per block) under the SR=O.OO/PR=O.OO three options condition, the prHference for the constant work-alone option also suggests that a nonsocial option was preferred over a social option. When work-with-others choices could increase the partner's earnings but had no effect on the subject's earnings (SR=0.00/PR=0.50 conditions), 3 subjects (2509, 2532, and 2728) preferred the work-with-others option and 1 subject (2598) showed no strong preference between the two. When the constant alone option was added (SR=0.00/PR=0.50 three options conditions) to separate the effects on choice of increases in the partner's earnings and variance reduction, choice varied across subjects. Two subjects (2532 and 2728) continued to prefer the sharing option. Because these subjects preferred the constant, alone option when the partner's requirement was zero (SR=O.OO/PR=O.OO three options) but the sharing option when the partner's requirement was $0.50 (SR=O.OO/ PR=0.50 three options conditions), this findin~J suggests that choice in these 2 subjects was sensitive to both local variance reduction and the partner's earnings. The third subject (2598) continued to show a preference for the alone option when the partner's requirement was $0.50 (SR=0.00/PR=0.50 three options conditions), and showed only a slight preference for the constant, alone option over the variable, alone option, suggesting that choice was not very sensitive to local variance reduction and was insensitive to the partner's earnings. Figure 6 shows mean earnings across conditions. Mean earnings were near $5.00 across conditions except durinlg the negative-earnings budget (SR=0.60/PR=0.00) condition in which mean earnings averaged near $3.70. Thus, similar to Experiment 1, choices tended to maximize earnings across conditions. Overall, Experiment 2 replicated the results of Experiment 1 by showing that choice was consistent with the predictions of risk-reduction accounts of food sharing: Choice was risk averse in positive budget conditions and risk prone in negative budget conditions. Experiment ::~ also showed that being exposed to budget conditions when the partner's earnings were hidden from view (partner's-earnings-absent conditions) was not necessary for obtaining sensitivity to the earnings budget when the partner's earnings were revealed to the subject (partner's-earnings-present conditions). Finally, Experiment 2 showed that that short-term variance reduction and (in some subjects) increases in the partner's earnings influenced choice under no-requirement (SR=O.OO) conditions. This latter finding is consistent with prior cooperation studies that have shown that subjects sometimes cooperate "altruistically" with others (e.g., Shimoff & Matthews, 1975) and indicates that choice was sensitive to social stimuli in this context. Additional research is needed to determine whether such altruistic sharing would be maintained if sharing benefited the partner but was costly to the subject (i.e., increased the risk of a shortfall).
General Discussion
Two experiments investigated sharing undnr laboratory conditions designed to model foraging in a stochastic environment. All 7 subjects exposed to conditions in which sharing minimized the probability that earnings would fall below the earnings requirement (positive earningsbudget conditions) preferred the sharing option. Similarly, all 8 subjects exposed to conditions in which working independently minimized the probability that earnings would fall below the requirement (negative earnings-budget conditions) preferred the work-alone option. These results are consistent with the predictions of food-sharing models based on the energy-budget rule (e.g. , Winterhalder, 1997) and replicate and extend the results of previous laboratory studies with humans that have also shown shifts in preference across earnings-budget conditions designed to simulate positive and negative energy budgets (Pietras & Hackenberg, 2001; Pietras et aI. , 2003; Rode et aI., 1999) . The present results therefore provide additional evidence that the predictions of optimal foraging models, including the energy-budget rule , generalize to choice in humans for monetary outcomes under a variety of conditions (e.g. , Jacobs & Hackenberg , 1996; Pietras & Hackenberg, 2001; Stockhorst, 1994; and see Winterhalder & Smith, 2000) , including choice! in social contexts (e.g ., Kraft & Baum , 2001 ; Madden, Peden, & Yamaguchi, 2002 ; Sokolowski, Tonneau , & Freixa I Baque,1999) .
The preference for the sharing option under positive earningsbudget conditions corresponds to the results of finld studies showing that individuals frequently share valuable but unpredictable food items (e.g ., Cashdan, 1985; Gurven, Hill, et aI., 2000; Hames, 1990; Kaplan & Hill , 1985) . Similarly, the preference for the work-alone option under negative earnings-budget conditions is in accord with anthropological studies reporting that sharing decreases under extreme environmental conditions when food is scarce (e.g ., Wiessner, 1982; and see Gurven , 2004b) . The consistency of the results with previous resnarch suggests that the earnings-budget procedure may be a useful experimental procedure for investigating the effects of shortfall risk on resource sharing.
During no-requirement (SR=O.OO) conditions, preference varied across subjects but most subjects either showed or devE310ped a preference for the sharing option . Results from the three-option conditions in Experiment 2 indicated that, in some subjects, the preference for the sharing option may be attributed to a preference for a low-variance over a highvariance option. The preference for a low-variance option is consistent with the results of risky-choice studies with humans (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kahn, Kahn , & Staddon , 1992; Lane & Cherek, 1999) and nonhumans (see Kacelnik & Bateson, 1996) that have shown that certain options are typically preferred to probabilistic options in the absence of explicit shortfall risks (i.e., energy-budget manipulations).
Choice patterns maintained earnings near the programmed (mean) maximum of $5 .00 du ring positive earnings-budget (SR=0.50) conditions and $3.44 during negative earnings-budget (SR=0.60) conditions. If the work-alone option had been preferred during positive earnings-budget conditions, earnings would have averaged near $3.44; and if the workwith-others option had been preferred during negative earnings-budget conditions , earnings would have been $0.00. That choices maxim ized earnings is consistent with the results of field studies showing that cooperative foraging choice in humans is often in accord with the predictions of optimization models (e.g., Smith , 1985) and with the results of laboratory studies with humans showing that subjects frequently cooperate with others when cooperative choices produce higher earnings (e.g., Matthews, 1977) or a greater probability of reward (e.g., Kahan , 1968) than independent choices. These findings are therefore consistent with the view that cooperative behavior may be interpreted in te rms of the relative costs and benefits of cooperative and noncooperative choices for the individual (e.g., Clements & Stephens, 1995; Skinner, 1953; Trivers, 1971 ; Hawkes, 1992) .
Because choice patterns could be accounted for by the different probabilities of reinforcement for work-alone and work-with-others choices, it is unclear whether choice was influenced by social variables (i.e., the presence of another person). Although subjects indicated on postsession questionnaires that they believed they were paired with others, that the "c" (work-with-others) option was described as a social option may have been unimportant to choice. To investigate whether social variables affected preference in this procedure, in Experiment 2 subjects were exposed to conditions in which sharing did not affect their own earnings but increased the partner's earnings (the subject's earnings requirement was $0.00 and the partner's earnings requirement was $0.50). "Altruistic" sharing occurred in 2 subjects, indicating that, at least in some subjects, choice was sensitive to social variables in this procedure.
Additional manipulations are needed, however, to better evaluate the effects of social variables on sharing in this choice context. For example, sharing could be investigated under conditions in wh ich sharing is costly to the subject, or when the subject and partner receive unequal shares of the pooled total. The effects on choice of the presence of the partner could be evaluated directly by investigating choice when the subject is told that the partner is a computer rather than a person. Future studies could also manipulate social variables shown to influence cooperation in other contexts, such as the familiarity of the partner (e.g., Marwell & Schmitt, 1975) . Finally, sharing could be studied in more complex social situations, such as those involving delayed reciprocity (i.e. , reciprocal altruism) or multiple sharing partners. When sharing involves delayed reciprocity and multiple sharing partners, the benefits of cooperation may be reduced by failures to recip rocate and the discounting of delayed returns (e.g., Hawkes, 1992) . Investigating sharing under conditions in which social variables are manipulated will therefore be important not only for assessing the generality of risk-reduction sharing models, but also for identifying variables maintaining sharing under shortfall risk when reciprocation is both uncertain and delayed.
Risk minimization is one of many variables that may affect food sharing in human societies (Bliege Bird & Bird, 1997; Bliege Bird et aI., 2001; Gurven, Allen -Arave, Hill, & Hurtado, 2000; Hawkes, 1993; Hill & Kaplan, 1993; Smith & Bliege Bird, 2000) . When shortfall risk does influence sharing, it may operate in conjunction with other variables (e.g., Bliege Bird & Bird, 1997; Gurven, 2004b; Gurven, Hill, et aI., 2004) . The present studies showed that a laboratory choice procedure is useful for analyzing the effects of shortfall risk on sharing. The results contribute to the analysis of sharing and risk sensitive choice by showing that risk reduction can influence choice apart from the effects of other variables, and that risk-sensitive sharing models can be applied to the pooling and sharing of resources other than food.
